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INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2002, squads of up to twenty police officers
descended upon the toughest crime and drug-ridden street corners
of Wilmington, Delaware, as a part of Operation Bold Eagle, a police
1
initiative to combat a rash of shootings. These “corner deployment
units” or “jump-out squads”—as the residents referred to them—
patrolled in unmarked vehicles until they established reasonable
2
suspicion that crime was occurring. Next, police confronted the
3
individuals, frisking and photographing each person. Some of these
people were arrested, while others were simply asked to leave the
4
area.
1. See Lee Williams & Adam Taylor, ‘Jump Out’ Squads Seen as a Violation of Civil
Rights, NEWS J. (Wilmington, Del.), Feb. 21, 2005, at A7 (reporting that in two
months the operation questioned 565 people, arrested 248 individuals and “seized
5.4 pounds of cocaine, 6.6 pounds of marijuana, 1.7 grams of heroin, three
handguns and $8952”).
2. See Nadya Labi, Stop! And Say Cheese, TIME, Sept. 23, 2002, at 53 (reporting
police insistence that they establish individualized suspicion through surveillance
before using the jump-out squad tactic); Ryan Lizza, The Year in Ideas: Ghetto Profiling,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2002, § 6 (Magazine), at 94, 95 (describing the police practice
and citing Wilmington officials’ statements that the detentions are justified by
reasonable suspicion); Adam Taylor, Police Out-Jump Dealers, NEWS J. (Wilmington,
Del.), Aug. 5, 2002, at A1 (quoting police officer’s statement that “[s]ometimes it’s
tedious, like when we are waiting for the scout cars to tell us a drug buy has been
made . . . . [b]ut 15 minutes later, it’s like a paramilitary exercise, when we’re out of
the van and on top of a crowd in seconds because we spotted something”).
3. See Tony Allen & Louis L. Redding, Rules Against Searches Apply in the ‘Hood
Too, NEWS J. (Wilmington, Del.), Aug. 30, 2002, at A15 (“Once the police assess that
there is criminal activity in a location, they search everyone in the immediate area for
drugs or guns.”); Adam Taylor, Police Photo Squads Under Fire, NEWS J. (Wilmington,
Del.), Aug. 25, 2002, at A1 (reporting that police stop individuals, line them up
against a wall, and frisk them for weapons).
4. See Lizza, supra note 2 (noting that officials claim that the “only faces added
to the database are of individuals connected to the corner drug-dealing operation”
and not innocent bystanders).
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Those who were not arrested nevertheless had their photographs
5
taken and their names and addresses recorded. The photographs
were used to establish a database of possible suspects to use in future
6
criminal investigations. These tactics brought nationwide attention
to Wilmington, leading Mayor James M. Baker to staunchly defend
7
police practices. However, with scrutiny of the national media
highlighting this practice, these “photostops”—as they have been
8
9
called in other parts of the country —ceased.
This Comment examines the constitutionality of photostops in
light of contemporary Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and the
increasing use and judicial treatment of database technology.
Specifically, this Comment argues that capturing and databasing a
non-arrestee’s photograph for future criminal investigation violates
the Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness as articulated in
10
Terry v. Ohio, unless the photograph is reasonably related to the
suspicion that initially justified the stop.
Part I examines the use of photostops nationally, proposes a
classification system for the circumstances when police capture
photographs, and explains the relevant transitions in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, focusing on the recent tension in
Supreme Court jurisprudence in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of
11
12
Nevada and Illinois v. Caballes. Part II argues that photostops may
violate an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights under the second
prong of the Terry analysis, which requires that an investigative
technique be “reasonably related” to the original suspicion that
justified the stop. This section continues with an assessment of
5. Steven Church, Anti-Drug Operation is Defended, NEWS J. (Wilmington, Del.),
Aug. 30, 2002, at B3 (reporting that more than 117 people had been stopped and
photographed without being charged).
6. See Taylor, supra note 3 (confirming Police Chief Michael Szczerba’s
explanation that the photographs and personal information of the individuals
stopped—primarily minority men—were being placed in a database to use in future
photographic lineups).
7. See Lizza, supra note 2 (reporting Mayor Baker’s statement, “[u]ntil a court
says otherwise, if I say it’s constitutional, it’s constitutional”); Taylor, supra note 3
(“Mayor James M. Baker said criticism of the photographing is ‘asinine and
intellectually bankrupt’ and he will not stop the practice.”).
8. See Hong H. Tieu, Picturing the Asian Gang Member Among Us, 11 ASIAN PAC.
AM. L.J. 41, 44 (2006) (describing similar tactics used in California and referring to
the interaction as a photostop); infra Part I.A.2 (explaining the use of a similar tactics
in California and Philadelphia).
9. See Williams & Taylor, supra note 1 (noting that after national criticism, the
department stopped photographing individuals who were not arrested, but
continued using however, the “jump-out” squads).
10. 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968).
11. 542 U.S. 177 (2004).
12. 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
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photostops under Caballes, the 2005 Supreme Court case which
considered the use of a drug detection dog during a traffic stop, and
argues that Caballes should be distinguished and not applied to the
analysis of photostops. Finally, Part III examines the validity of the
derivative use of evidence—databasing a photograph that has been
legally captured—by drawing on the jurisprudence regarding
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) databasing. Ultimately, this Comment
concludes that the courts must limit the use of photostops and
photographic databases because the legislature is politically inclined
to sacrifice individual privacy rights in the name of crime prevention.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Defining Photostops
For more than twenty-five years, police have photographed
suspected gang members to use the photographs in future criminal
13
investigations. This practice is referred to by different terms across
the country and each police department that utilizes this technique
14
does so in a unique way. This Comment uses the term “photostop”
to mean police capturing an individual’s photograph during an
investigatory stop. “Capturing” a photograph refers to the act of
recording an image. The term “databasing” describes the act of
indexing a photograph in a searchable system that allows people to
access the image.
1. “Mug books” and gang databases
Typically, photostops are used to generate information about
15
Communities
suspected gang members for future investigations.
have used a broad range of policies to determine when to conduct
16
photostops.
While initially these photographs and other
13. See H.G. Reza, Directive Orders Photographing of Youths by Police, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
16, 1985, § 2 (San Diego County Ed.), at 1 (noting that San Diego police officers
were asked in a 1982 directive to obtain photographs of suspected gang members
and were advised that until the Court rules otherwise, the practice is legal).
14. See infra Part I.A.2 (exploring regional uses of photostops).
15. See, e.g., Mike Burge, Careless Police Use of Camera is Assailed, SAN DIEGO UNION,
Dec. 15, 1991, at A1 (describing an incident where a fourteen-year-old boy was
photographed when ticketed for riding his bicycle illegally and two days later police
showed the youth’s photograph to a victim who claimed to have been raped by a
gang member with the same first name); Lizza, supra note 2 (reporting Wilmington,
Delaware police chief’s comment that photographs would be used to establish a
database of potential suspects to aide investigations of future crime).
16. Compare People v. Rodriguez, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 600, 664 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)
(articulating one police department’s policy of stopping and photographing
individuals that officers “believe may be involved in a gang”), with Labi, supra note 2

2008]

SAY CHEESE!

1697

information obtained during field interviews were compiled into
“mug books” or “gang books,” today the information is transferred
17
into computerized databases.
Increasingly, police departments and law enforcement agencies are
18
using gang databases to combat gang violence. These databases
contain personal information about suspected gang members,
including gang allegiance, street name, address, physical description,
19
identifying marks, tattoos, and photographs.
Fourteen states
currently use “GangNet,” an Internet-based networking and gang
database, to track gang members and share information between
20
agencies.
State and local agencies have varying standards for
(noting that Wilmington, Delaware police report establishing individualized
suspicion before conducting photostops).
17. See Tieu, supra note 8, at 44 (noting that California police departments
“collect names, nicknames, gang insignia tattoos, car types, and photographs of gang
members and their associates” to enter into “mug books” and that the CalGang
database contains information taken from local police department’s mug books).
Despite the name, many individuals whose photographs are included in a “mug
book” have not been arrested. See Rodriguez, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 664 (stating that it
was the police department’s policy to take photographs of a suspected gang member
for “gang books” “whether or not that individual is at that time involved in criminal
activity”).
18. See, e.g., Jim Adams, Officers Share Names to Battle Gangs, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), Feb. 24, 1998, at B1 (reporting on a statewide database consisting of a
list of gang members, increased rates of gang activity in the Twin Cities suburbs, and
the arrest of four alleged gang members who burst into a high school to threaten
students); Editorial, ‘GangNet’ Bears Watching, DENV. POST, Sept. 28, 2002, at B23
(reporting on a database maintained by the Colorado Bureau of Investigation that
supplies forty state agencies with a list of suspected gang members, cautioning that
“just because a youth looks like a thug to some people doesn’t necessarily mean he is
a thug”); Renae Merle, Cornyn, Perry Tout New Laws Aimed at Gangs, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEWS, June 30, 1999, at 7B (noting the creation of Texas’ statewide
database). But see Elaine Aradillas, Fewer Agencies Use State Gang Database, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, July 25, 2006, at B1 (describing declining use of gang database in Florida,
with one-third of participating law-enforcement agencies dropping out of the system
in one year because agencies refused to share intelligence and did not keep the
information up to date).
19. See Linda S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith, Demonizing Youth, 34 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 747, 760 (2001) (listing the information that databases contain and remarking
that police often obtain the information in the databases from the suspected gang
members themselves, who answer questions and are photographed). Fear of
retaliation from police or a lack of knowledge of the legal system are plausible
reasons why individuals answer questions and agree to be photographed. See, e.g., id.;
A. Morgan Baker, Instant Photos Offer Gang Crime Fighters Compelling Evidence, INT’L
ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, 1998, http://www.iacptechnology.org/Library/
GangPhotos.htm (quoting Sergeant Dan K. McQueen of the Pinal County Sheriff’s
Department and head of the local chapter of the Arizona State Gang Task Force,
“[y]ou’d be surprised how often these kids—especially the younger, less
sophisticated ones—are happy to throw their gang signs for you [to photograph]”);
Jennifer Lin, Police Photo Sweeps Anger Asians, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 25, 1992, at A1
(citing intimidation and unawareness that they could refuse as reasons why Asian
refugees agreed to be photographed by police).
20. See Scott Shewfelt, Maryland Begins Networking Street Gang Problem, CAPITAL
NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 16, 2007, http://www.journalism.umd.edu/cns/wire/2007-

1698

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:1693

determining when an individual should be included in the gang
21
Gang databases allow police to monitor associations
database.
between gang members and individuals associated with gang
22
members.
Creating databases that contain photographs of suspected gang
members poses serious problems because there are few safeguards to
protect an individual from being falsely identified as a gang member,
23
photographed, and entered into a gang database. Photostop and
24
database policies run the risks of condoning racial profiling,
25
increasing mistaken eyewitness identification, and encouraging
26
police deceit and intimidation to obtain consent, yet communities
27
continue to use photostops.
editions/03-March-editions/070316-Friday/GangNetMaryland_CNS-UMCP.html
(noting that Maryland, the District of Columbia, and Virginia were in the process of
joining GangNet in 2007, bringing the total number of states using GangNet up to
fourteen).
21. See Joshua D. Wright, The Constitutional Failure of Gang Databases, 2 STAN. J.
C.R. & C.L. 115, 125–26 (2005) (explaining that in Texas the criteria for
documenting suspected gang members and databasing their information are
established by statute and include using “criminal street gang dress, hand signals,
tattoos, or symbols”); Anne-Marie O’Connor, Massive Gang Member List Now Clouded by
Rampart, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2000, at A1 (reporting Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
Department requirement that a suspect meet at least two “gang criteria”—professing
to be a gang member, being deemed a gang member by a reliable source, having
gang graffiti on personal property or clothing, using gang hand signals, “hang[ing]
around with gang members,” being arrested with gang members, or identifying gang
affiliation when brought to jail—before being included in the CalGang database).
22. See, e.g., Shewfelt, supra note 20 (describing GangNet’s link-diagram analysis
that shows relationships between gang members).
23. See Beres & Griffith, supra note 19 (listing several of the problems with gang
databases: lists are secret, individuals do not know if they have been placed on the
list, officers do not need approval to place an entry in the database, and there are
rarely mechanisms to have one’s name removed once it has been entered).
24. See, e.g., Carol Kreck, Police to Share GangNet Database, DENV. POST, Sept. 24,
2002, at B3 (noting the national attention Denver received when it was disclosed that
the city’s gang list included two-thirds of the black men in the city and that more
than ninety-three percent of the individuals on the list were African American or
Latino); Paul Maryniak, Cops to End Asian Photo Sweeps Bar Helps to Forge New Agreement,
PHILA. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 30, 1993, at 18 (explaining that the agreement reached in
Philadelphia prohibits police from photographing individuals solely based race or
ethnicity and ended the practice of photographing “suspicious looking” Asian
Americans); O’Connor, supra note 21 (reporting that, according to the Los Angles
Sheriff’s Department CalGang coordinator Wes McBride, only 2000 of the 250,000
individuals in the Los Angeles database are white).
25. See, e.g., De Tran & Iris Yokoi, O.C. Asians Say Police Photos are Harassment, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 1992, (Orange County Ed.), at A1 (reciting the story of Ted Nguyen,
a Vietnamese construction worker in San Jose who spent three months in jail
awaiting trial when he was accused of a violent gang crime because a victim chose his
photograph from an “all-Asian mug book”).
26. See Beth Burkstrand, Gang Files Under Fire, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Aug. 22,
1996, (Metro. Ed.), at 1 (reporting a police officer’s acknowledgement that he used
deceit—telling youths the photos were taken in case they were ever missing—to
obtain permission to take their photographs). But see Kreck, supra note 24 (noting
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2. “Stops,” “sweeps,” and “raids”: Photostops nationally
Faced with increased gang violence, many large cities and urban
areas have utilized photostops to generate profiles of suspected gang
28
However, the
members to use in future criminal investigations.
practice is also used in smaller cities, rural areas, and suburban
29
communities not typically associated with gang violence.
This
section highlights the practices in California and Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania—two areas that have struggled with the permissibility of
photostops.
a. Photostops in California
Since the 1980s, California police officers have been
photographing gang members and suspected gang members and in
30
turn using those photographs in future investigations. In the late
1980s, California was the first state to make a computerized gang
31
database. California maintains the “CalGang” database, the largest
and first of its type in the country, which has information on known
32
and suspected gang members and individuals associated with gangs.
Although California continues to utilize photostops to generate
photographs and biographical information for the CalGang database,
that the captain of Denver’s Gang Unit dismisses criticism, offering that the youths
consent and they “give them copies [of the photographs]”).
27. See, e.g., David Bracken, Teens Menace Knightdale, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), May 9, 2005, at B1 (reporting one North Carolina town’s practice of
photographing predominantly African American teenagers suspected of being
affiliated with gangs).
28. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 19 (articulating photostop techniques used in
Atlanta, the Tucson/Phoenix metropolitan area, and Los Angeles); Kreck, supra note
24 (describing the Denver police practice of photographing youths in public—asking
the youths to “lift their shirts to show tattoos and photograph them for their
database”); Sharon McBreen, Suit Hits Photos by Police, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 7,
1993, at B-1 (writing about the police practice that has lead to hundreds of
individuals being photographed in Central Florida).
29. See, e.g., Burkstrand, supra note 26 (reporting on the Omaha police practice
of taking Polaroid pictures of suspected gang members or people who associate with
gang members and recording detailed personal information); Stephen Clutter,
Looking for Trouble, SEATTLE TIMES, July 17, 1991, at F1 (explaining that the strategy of
a Seattle suburb’s Gang Unit is “photographing kids associated with gangs” and that
most youths agree to have their photographs taken); Town Police to Hassle Youth Gang
Members as Far as Law Allows, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Dec. 19, 1995, at B4 (describing one
Alabama police chief’s instructions on identifying and photographing potential gang
members).
30. See Reza, supra note 13 (reporting on the San Diego Police Department’s use
of photostops in 1982). See generally Jin S. Choi & Ernest Kim, The Constitutional Status
of Photo Stops: The Implications of Terry and Its Progeny, 2 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 60 (1994)
(describing the use of photostops in California in the early 1990s).
31. Tieu, supra note 8, at 44.
32. See id. (noting that the California Department of Justice estimates the
number of individuals in the CalGang database at 250,000; however, some critics
contend the database contains over 300,000 entries).
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these practices have been criticized and there have been calls for
33
California cities have been forced to answer lawsuits
reform.
34
contesting the use of photostops. For example, as the result of a
settlement agreement to a class action lawsuit, one California city
agreed to curtail its use of photostops that are not based on
35
reasonable suspicion or consent. The most recent suit arose from a
36
2002 police round-up of students at a Union City high school.
Police racially segregated sixty Asian American and Latino students
into separate classrooms, searched them and their belongings, forced
the students to provide personal information, and photographed the
37
students without probable cause or reasonable suspicion. In 2005,
the parties reached a settlement agreement stipulating that the
photographs be destroyed and new guidelines be implemented for
38
local police photographing youth.
33. See, e.g., Shawn Hubler, A Sobering Lesson in Guilt By Association, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 27, 2000, at B1 (criticizing the secret nature of the publicly funded CalGang
database and comparing it to police lists during the McCarthy era); George Ramos,
Youths Offered Way to Get Off State Database, L.A. TIMES, July 25, 2000, at B1 (describing
a gang intervention program that could potentially help youths remove their name
from the CalGang database).
34. See, e.g., Burge, supra note 15 (recounting San Diego County’s settlement of a
case where a fourteen-year-old boy was photographed when ticketed for riding his
bicycle illegally); Tran & Yokoi, supra note 25 (noting a suit filed against San Jose and
the San Jose Police Department contending that the photostop and inclusion of the
photograph in a mug book violated the individual’s constitutional rights).
35. See Tieu, supra note 8, at 50 (explaining that the settlement in Quyen Pham v.
City of Garden Grove provided the class with $85,000, apology letters from the police
department, removal of the plaintiffs’ photographs from police files, and revision of
the police department’s policy). The settlement requires officers to establish
reasonable suspicion that the detainee was engaged in criminal activity and record
their reasoning for detaining gang suspects or to obtain written consent before
photographing a detainee. Davan Maharaj, Rights Suit Involving Police Photos is Settled,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1995, at A1. In one incident giving rise to the suit, police
officers stopped three Vietnamese teenagers who were gathered by a pay phone
while waiting for a ride because the officers considered the girls’ clothes—baggy
pants and tight fitting shirts—to be gang attire and the area was frequented by gang
members. Id.; Tieu, supra note 8, at 50. The officers questioned the girls, ordered
the them to stand against a wall, photographed them with a Polaroid camera without
their consent, and recorded their age, height, weight, eye color, hair color, home
address, and the school they attended. Doreen Carvajal, O.C. Girl Challenges Police
Photo Policy: Attorneys Contend Youths’ Attire, Race Made them Targets of Mug Shots for
Gang File, L.A. TIMES, May 20, 1994, at A1.
36. Press Release, ACLU of N. Cal., ACLU Challenges Unconstitutional Round
Up of Union City High School Students (Jan. 30, 2003),
http://www.aclunc.org/
news/press_releases/aclu_challenges_unconstitutional_roundup_of_union_city_hig
h_school_students.shtml (describing the class-action lawsuit filed on behalf of three
students).
37. See Benitez v. Montoya, No. C03-00392, 2004 WL 2370637, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 20, 2004) (stipulating many of these facts in addressing the defendant’s motion
to dismiss); see also Tieu, supra note 8, at 51–52 (detailing the incident).
38. See Press Release, ACLU of N. Cal., Union City Students Reach
Groundbreaking Settlement with Union City and School District (May 18, 2005),
http://www.aclunc.org/news/press_releases/union_city_students_reach_groundbre
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The California Court of Appeals expressly dealt with the photostop
practice and suppressed a photograph that was taken during an
39
investigatory stop of suspected gang members in People v. Rodriguez.
In Rodriquez, the police obtained the defendant’s photograph and
personal information for a gang book to investigate future crime,
even though, according to the investigating officer, the defendant
and four other youths were only “talking and socializing” outside an
40
apartment known as a gathering place of gang members.
The
police frisked them for weapons, ordered them to sit on the curb,
41
then interviewed and photographed them individually. Three days
later a witness in a homicide case selected Rodriguez’s photograph
42
from a “gang book.” The court found that Rodriguez had been
impermissibly detained without reasonable articulable suspicion;
43
thus, the photograph was the result of an illegal detention.
b. Photo sweeps in Philadelphia
Philadelphia police angered community leaders in the early
1990s when they conducted “photo sweeps” to photograph Asian
44
Americans who had not been accused of any crime.
Police
threatened that if they did not agree to have their pictures taken on
the spot, they would be taken to the police station to be
45
photographed.
Police then used the photographs to investigate
46
subsequent criminal activity.
After months of meetings between the Philadelphia Bar
Association, the Philadelphia Police Department, and the Mayor’s
Commission on Asian/Pacific American Affairs, the parties created a
aking_settlement_with_union_city_and_school_district.shtml (describing the
settlement agreement provisions, including the strict limits on when police can take
photographs of students, unless the student consents). Before obtaining that
consent, Union City police officers must tell the student how the photograph may be
used, including whether it will be included in any kind of database or mug book. Id.
39. 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 660 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
40. Id. at 663. The police detective testified that it was the “department’s policy
to ‘stop individuals who [officers] believe may be involved in a gang and take the
field identification information, in addition to a photograph, and then place that
into police files for potential later use regardless of whether or not that individual is
at that time involved in criminal activity . . . .’” Id. at 664.
41. Id. at 663.
42. Id. at 662.
43. See id. at 663–64 (holding that the photograph be suppressed as a product of
the illegal detention).
44. See Lin, supra note 19 (recounting the details of photo sweeps that happened
at a playground, at a pool hall, on the sidewalk, and at a video store’s game room).
45. See id. (noting one teenager’s response that “[t]here was no choice for
us . . . . One way or another, they were going to get our pictures”).
46. See id. (reporting that the Philadelphia Police Department’s organized-crime
unit lends the “mug books” to other departments to investigate crimes).
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police policy that prohibited randomly stopping and photographing
individuals based solely on race or “mere presence in a particular
47
area.” Under the new guidelines, a person is photographed only
when “probable cause exists to believe that the individual may have
committed the crime being investigated” and the photograph must
be destroyed if the suspicion that motivated the photograph is
48
dispelled.
3. Circumstances giving rise to photostops
The circumstances under which suspects are photographed can be
divided into five categories: (1) “Long-range Lens”—photographs
obtained without investigatory detention; (2) “Mug Shot”—
photographs obtained incident to arrest; (3) “Illegal Stop”—
photographs obtained during a stop that was not originally justified
by reasonable articulable suspicion; (4) “Unrelated Investigatory
Stop”—photographs obtained during an investigatory stop originally
justified by reasonable articulable suspicion, but the photographs are
not related to the investigation of the suspicion that initially justified
the stop, and; (5) “Related Investigatory Stop”—photographs
obtained during an investigatory stop originally justified by
reasonable articulable suspicion and the photographs are related to
the investigation of the suspicion that initially justified the stop.
As defined previously, the term “photostop” refers to an individual
being photographed during an investigatory stop. Illegal Stop,
Unrelated Investigatory Stop, and Related Investigatory Stop
photographs all occur during an investigatory detention and are the
focus of this Comment. Obtaining Long-range Lens photographs
does not require investigatory detentions and are not considered in
49
this Comment. Similarly, Mug Shot photographs are beyond the
scope of this piece because their capture occurs once an individual
50
has been arrested with probable cause.

47. Hank Grezlak, Bar, Police Agree on ‘Photo Sweeps’, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Sept.
30, 1993, at 1 (stating that, under the agreement, police will photograph suspects on
less than probable cause only under limited circumstances and when approved by
the police commissioner).
48. Id. (explaining that if the suspicion is cleared, the police department must
also inform the individual that his photograph was destroyed).
49. See infra notes 58–59 and accompanying text (establishing that
photographing that which an individual knowingly exposes to the public does not
fall within the scope of the Fourth Amendment’s protection).
50. See infra Part I.B.1 (explaining that it is accepted practice to photograph an
arrestee).
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B. Protecting Privacy: Modern Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence
Photostops potentially implicate the Fourth Amendment’s
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Fourth
Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
51
and seizures . . . .” The Supreme Court’s decision in Katz v. United
52
States, considering an individual’s manifest expectation of privacy
while defining what constitutes a search, marked a turning point in
53
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Justice Harlan’s concurrence
established “that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and,
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to
54
recognize as ‘reasonable.’” This reasonable expectation of privacy
standard balances the individual’s privacy interests and the
55
government’s interest in crime detection.
While it appears as
though Katz increased the protection of individual privacy, some
scholars suggest that Katz actually increased the authority of law
56
enforcement.
1. Judicial limitations on what qualifies as a search
The Supreme Court has found that certain investigatory police
techniques—from dog sniffs to aerial surveillance—are outside the
scope of the Fourth Amendment because they do not constitute

51. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
52. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
53. Id. at 351 (“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks
to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected.”) (internal citations omitted).
54. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). But see United States v. White, 401 U.S.
745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (warning that “[o]ur expectations . . . are in
large part reflections of laws . . .”).
55. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (citing
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)) (“[T]he permissibility of a particular
practice ‘is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment
interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’”); see also INS v.
Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 226 (1984) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (explaining the “inherent tension between our commitment to safeguarding
the precious, and all too fragile, right to go about one’s business free from
unwarranted government interference, and our recognition that the police must be
allowed some latitude in gathering information from those individuals who are
willing to cooperate”).
56. See Harold J. Krent, Of Diaries and Data Banks: Use Restrictions Under the Fourth
Amendment, 74 TEX. L. REV. 49, 58–59 (1995) (explaining that, in rejecting the
property limitations of the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court afforded law
enforcement the opportunity to search for any relevant item regardless of whether
the individual had a superior property interest).
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57

searches. Police observation of that which individuals knowingly
58
This “public
expose to the public is not considered a search.
exposure” doctrine allows police to photograph individuals when
59
they appear in public. Under the same principle, some courts have
60
held that obtaining voice exemplars does not constitute a search.
Additionally, even though fingerprints are not easy to observe, some
courts exclude fingerprinting from Fourth Amendment protection,
reasoning that fingerprints are exposed to the public and therefore
61
not a search.
However, there is some variation in how courts view the
62
technologically enhanced scrutiny of publicly exposed information.
Although some courts hold that fingerprinting does not constitute a
search under the public exposure doctrine, some courts find that the
detailed structure of the prints is not common knowledge, and

57. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450 (1989) (holding that aerial
surveillance from a helicopter is not a search); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696,
707 (1983) (finding that a dog sniff of a suitcase in an airport is not a search);
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284–85 (1983) (ruling that placing a tracking
device in an item purchased by a suspect is not a search). But see Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (holding that the use of sense-enhancing technology,
that is not in general public use, to obtain information about the interior of a home
is a search).
58. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(requiring the individual to manifest the intent that the information be kept
private).
59. See North Carolina v. Williams, 277 S.E.2d 434, 437 (N.C. 1981) (finding that
a photograph taken by the police was admissible even if the defendant did not
consent, because the “fourth amendment offers no shield for that which an
individual knowingly exposes to public view”).
60. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973).
The physical characteristics of a person’s voice, its tone and manner, as
opposed to the content of a specific conversation, are constantly exposed to
the public. Like a man’s facial characteristics, or handwriting, his voice is
repeatedly produced for others to hear. No person can have a reasonable
expectation that others will not know the sound of his voice, any more than
he can reasonably expect that his face will be a mystery to the world.
Id.
61. Compare Palmer v. State, 679 N.E.2d 887, 891 (Ind. 1997) (finding
“fingerprints are an identifying factor readily available to the world at large” and
fingerprinting without a warrant was not an illegal seizure), and Hayes v. Florida, 470
U.S. 811, 818 (1985) (“None of the foregoing implies that a brief detention in the
field for the purpose of fingerprinting, where there is only reasonable suspicion not
amounting to probable cause, is necessarily impermissible under the Fourth
Amendment.”), with Paulson v. Florida, 360 F. Supp. 156, 161 (S.D. Fla. 1973)
(finding that fingerprinting constitutes a search).
62. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 388 F.2d 842, 845 (6th Cir. 1968)
(shining an ultraviolet light on the suspect’s hands is not a search); State v.
Holzapfel, 748 P.2d 953, 957 (Mont. 1988) (same), overruled by State v. Hardaway, 36
P.3d 900 (Mont. 2001). But see People v. Santistevan, 715 P.2d 792, 795 (Colo. 1986)
(holding that use of an ultraviolet light to “discover incriminating evidence not
otherwise observable” constitutes a search).

2008]

SAY CHEESE!

1705

63

extends past what is easy to observe. Recognizing this discrepancy,
courts have occasionally found that the scrutiny of evidence, legally
64
seized, constitutes an additional search.
Acknowledging the importance of identifying arrestees, courts have
created an exception to the warrant requirement. Referred to as the
“true identity” doctrine, it justifies searching an arrestee’s personal
property and taking mug shots and fingerprints for identification
65
purposes without a warrant. In 1900, the Indiana Supreme Court
held that a sheriff had the discretion to take an arrestee’s photograph
and record his physical description if “he should deem it necessary to
the safe-keeping of a prisoner and to prevent his escape, or to enable
him the more readily to retake the prisoner if he should
66
escape . . . .”
Case law clearly establishes that a person in lawful
custody may be required to submit to photographing and
67
fingerprinting for routine identification.
2.

Seizures
The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable
seizures is also implicated when assessing photostops because the
police typically have stopped or detained the individual who is
photographed. While the standard for whether police action
constitutes a seizure is clear at the two ends of the spectrum—
63. See D.H. Kaye, The Constitutionally of DNA Sampling on Arrest, 10 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 455, 485 (2001) (explaining the broad use of the public exposure
doctrine to remove fingerprinting from Fourth Amendment scrutiny).
64. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658 (1995) (ruling that
urinalysis testing was a search, even though the sample was already in the
government’s possession); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616–
17 (1989) (same); Ross v. State, 475 A.2d 481, 486–87 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984)
(ruling that watching video tape after it was legally obtained qualifies as an
additional search); see also Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990) (finding that the
legal seizure of a briefcase does not necessarily give police authority to analyze its
contents).
65. See Kaye, supra note 63, at 485–86 (detailing the historic importance of
identifying arrestees that has created an exception to the warrant requirement and
considering its applicability to arrestee DNA collection).
66. State ex rel. Bruns v. Clausmier, 57 N.E. 541, 541–42 (Ind. 1900) (rejecting
the arrestee’s claim for damages when the sheriff took his picture and placed the
image in the “Rogues’ Gallery” and sent the image to other law enforcement officers,
even though the arrestee had not had “any opportunity to prove his innocence of the
charge” and was later acquitted).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Krapf, 285 F.2d 647, 650–51 (3d Cir. 1961)
(classifying fingerprinting as a routine means of identification); United States v.
Amorosa, 167 F.2d 596, 599 (3d Cir. 1948) (maintaining that photographs obtained
lawfully for “routine identification” purposes upon arrest are permissible); United
States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 1932) (upholding fingerprinting upon arrest
for identification purposes); see also Illinois v. LaFayette, 462 U.S. 640, 646 (1983)
(“[I]nspection of an arrestee’s personal property may assist the police in ascertaining
or verifying his identity.”).
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68

consensual police contact is not a seizure and physical detention is a
69
seizure —the Supreme Court established in United States v.
70
Mendenhall the standard for seizures of persons for the less clear-cut
cases. Under the Mendenhall test, if a reasonable person, given the
totality of the circumstances, would not feel free to leave, he has been
71
seized. The Court refined the “free to leave” standard in Florida v.
72
73
Bostick, focusing on the coercive pressure that the police apply. A
seizure can occur whenever a person is detained “against his will,”
74
including both a full-fledged arrest and an “investigatory detention.”
C. Terry v. Ohio: A Limited Intrusion Based on Reasonable Suspicion
Recognizing that police need to be able to investigate imminent or
on-going crime, the Supreme Court upheld a limited search for
weapons and seizure of a person on less than probable cause in Terry
75
v. Ohio.
The rationale of Terry focuses on the reasonableness
analysis of the Fourth Amendment and attempts to balance
76
individual rights and police interests. For an investigative “Terrystop” to be constitutional, the officer’s actions must satisfy two
requirements: (1) the stop must be “justified at its inception,” and
(2) the subsequent police action must be “reasonably related in scope
to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
77
place.” Reasonable articulable suspicion is the standard of proof

68. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) (“[M]ere police questioning
does not constitute a seizure.”).
69. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968) (“It must be recognized that
whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk
away, he has ‘seized’ that person.”).
70. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
71. Id. at 554.
72. 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
73. See id. at 431–32 (finding it significant that the officer informed the bus
passenger that he could refuse to consent to the search and that the officer did not
remove his gun from its pouch).
74. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 294 (1973) (citation omitted); see Tennessee
v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985) (“[T]here can be no question that apprehension by
the use of deadly force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of the
Fourth Amendment.”); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726–27 (1969) (“Nothing is
more clear than that the Fourth Amendment was meant to prevent wholesale
intrusions upon the personal security of our citizenry, whether these intrusions be
termed ‘arrests’ or ‘investigatory detentions.’”).
75. 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (recognizing a police officer’s need to intervene when
he observed two men behaving suspiciously—as though they were “casing” a store for
robbery).
76. Id. at 21 (determining reasonableness “by balancing the need to search (or
seize) against the invasion which the search (or seizure) entails”) (citation omitted).
77. Id. at 20.
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78

necessary to justify a Terry-stop. The decision in Terry allows police
to freeze a situation in order to investigate, reflecting the
79
government’s interest in investigating and preventing crime.
1. Limits on a Terry-stop: The Caballes and Hiibel tension
While a seizure is permissible when based on reasonable articulable
suspicion, the Court has provided differing standards for what law
enforcement officials are permitted to investigate once they have
satisfied this standard of proof. In Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court
of Nevada, the Court suggested that an investigative technique must
have an “immediate relation” to the circumstances that justified the
80
initial stop and that police could not alter the nature of the stop.
The Court in Hiibel upheld the conviction of an individual who failed
to identify himself upon the request of a police officer, as required
under a state statute, because “[i]dentity may prove particularly
important in cases such as this, where the police are investigating
81
what appears to be a domestic assault.”
The following term, the Supreme Court did not apply the same
82
The Court found that it was
standard in Illinois v. Caballes.
permissible to use a drug detection dog where the sole justification
83
for the initial stop was that the driver was speeding on a highway.
The Supreme Court of Illinois applied the second prong of the Terry
analysis and ruled that the use of the dog “unjustifiably enlarg[ed]

78. Id. at 21 (“[I]n justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be
able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.”).
79. Id. at 22 (recognizing the general governmental interest of “crime prevention
and detection” can justify an investigation before there is probable cause to arrest).
80. Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 188 (2004) (finding that
police could constitutionally demand identification and arrest the defendant for
failing to provide identification when there was a state statute requiring production
of identification because verifying identification “has an immediate relation to the
purpose, rationale, and practical demands of a Terry stop”).
81. Id. at 186 (explaining that officers “need to know whom they are dealing with
in order to assess the situation, the threat to their own safety, and possible danger to
the potential victim”).
82. 543 U.S. 405 (2005); see 6 WAYNE LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.3 (Supp.
2006) (criticizing the Court’s failure to acknowledge the departure from established
precedent).
83. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 406-407 (acknowledging that the defendant was stopped
by a state trooper for driving six miles per hour over the posted speed limit on an
interstate highway and assuming that this was the only information that a second
officer who reported to the scene, without being requested to do so, had about the
driver). The second officer walked his drug-detection dog around the car while the
first office completed the warning citation. “The dog alerted at the trunk” and a
subsequent search discovered marijuana. Id. at 406.

1708

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:1693
84

the scope of a routine traffic stop into a drug investigation.” The
Supreme Court overturned that decision, holding that “conducting a
dog sniff would not change the character of a traffic stop that is
lawful at its inception and otherwise executed in a reasonable
85
The Court did not apply the “reasonably related”
manner . . . .”
standard articulated in Terry and applied in Hiibel; instead, it required
only that the stop be reasonably executed and not prolonged beyond
the time necessary to complete the investigation that originally
86
justified the stop. The majority opinion simply reiterated that the
dog sniff was not a search, emphasizing that there is no privacy
87
interest in contraband.
II. ANALYZING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PHOTOSTOPS UNDER
TERRY AND ITS PROGENY
The Terry-stop framework provides a strong claim against the
legality of taking a detainee’s photograph during an investigatory
detention. The first prong of a Terry analysis requires that the stop be
88
lawful or valid from its inception.
This requirement renders all
Illegal Stop photographs—photostops for the sole purpose of adding
a person’s photo to a database or identification book—impermissible,
as well as any stops that were illegal at their inception for any other

84. People v. Caballes, 802 N.E.2d 202, 205 (Ill. 2003), cert. granted, 541 U.S. 972
(2004), vacated, 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
85. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408.
86. See id. at 407 (“A seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a
warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time
reasonably required to complete that mission.”). Only the dissent explicitly
recognized that the Caballes decision abandoned the investigatory means aspect of
the second prong of the Terry analysis. See id. at 419 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the majority’s decision, allowing a suspicionless drug-sniffing dog
search during a routine traffic stop “diminishes the Fourth Amendment’s force by
abandoning the second Terry inquiry” regarding the reasonable relationship between
the scope of the search and the justification for the stop). Justice Ginsberg, joined by
Justice Souter, maintained in her dissent that the use of a drug-detection dog is
intimidating and that it “changes the character of the encounter between the police
and the motorist. The stop becomes broader, more adversarial, and (in at least some
cases) longer.” Id. at 421.
87. See id. at 411 (majority opinion) (explaining that a dog sniff can only detect
the presence of items that do not have a legal use; therefore, the individual does not
have a legitimate privacy interest and the sniff is not considered a search); id. at 410
(“A dog sniff conducted during a concededly lawful traffic stop that reveals no
information other than the location of a substance that no individual has any right to
possess does not violate the Fourth Amendment.”). But see id. at 410–11 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that dog sniffs are fallible and do not necessarily signal
contraband, necessitating reconsideration of their treatment as a non-search).
88. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
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89

reason. The second prong of the Terry analysis that requires law
enforcement action be “reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place,”
determines the legitimacy of any Unrelated Investigatory Stop or
Related Investigatory Stop photographs—those where the initial stop
is justified by reasonable suspicion
However, Caballes, if applied to photostops, changes the
90
permissibility of Unrelated Investigatory Stop photostops.
Ultimately, Caballes should be distinguished and not applied to
photostops because the extended life-span of a photograph in a
database creates a greater privacy intrusion, and the level of suspicion
present in Caballes—probable cause—is greater than the reasonable
91
suspicion that is required for a photostop.
A. Initially “Lawful” or “Valid”: The First Prong of Terry
The Supreme Court’s application of the first prong of the Terry
standard to a variety of investigatory techniques, including those not
considered a search, provides strong support for the proposition that
photographs obtained during an illegal detention must be
92
93
suppressed.
In Hayes v. Florida, the Supreme Court held that
transporting a suspect to the police station for fingerprinting, without
a warrant, probable cause, or consent, violated the Fourth
94
Amendment. The Court suggested in dicta that a brief detention
for fingerprinting could be constitutionally permissible if the
95
detention was supported by reasonable suspicion.
89. See People v. Rodriguez, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 660, 663–64 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)
(suppressing a “gang book” photograph that was captured during an investigatory
stop that was not justified by “specific and articulable facts”).
90. See infra Part II.C (explaining that Caballes Court did not apply the
“reasonably related” prong of the Terry standard as stringently as in prior case law).
91. See infra Part II.D (explaining why Caballes is distinguishable on two separate
grounds).
92. See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969) (“Detentions for the sole
purpose of obtaining fingerprints are no less subject to the constraints of the Fourth
Amendment.”); see also Bynum v. United States, 262 F.2d 465, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1958)
(finding the rules that govern statements during detention and personal articles
seized should apply to fingerprinting, explaining, “all three [investigatory
techniques] have the decisive common characteristic of being something of
evidentiary value which the public authorities have caused an arrested person to yield
to them during an illegal detention. If one such product of illegal detention is
proscribed, by the same token all should be proscribed”). The Supreme Court
agreed with this position and adopted it in Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 724
(1969).
93. 470 U.S. 811 (1985).
94. See id. at 814–15 (relying on the precedent established in Davis).
95. See id. at 816 (“None of the foregoing implies that a brief detention in the
field for the purpose of fingerprinting, where there is only reasonable suspicion not
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An Illegal Stop photostop, one not supported by reasonable
articulable suspicion, is impermissible under Terry because it is not
96
Detaining an individual for the sole
“justified at its inception.”
purpose of taking that individual’s photograph and adding it to a
database or gang book is an illegal detention, requiring exclusion of
97
the photograph. This type of photostop is impermissible because it
does not establish “specific and articulable facts” to justify the
98
intrusion.
B. Scope and Duration: The Second Prong of Terry
Under the second or “reasonably related” prong of Terry, a
photograph captured during a photostop is impermissible if the
police use it for a purpose beyond the scope of investigating the
99
suspicion that justified the stop or if taking the photograph
100
unreasonably prolonged the stop. This reasonably related prong of
the Terry standard has been understood to contain both a scope and a
101
duration component.
From its 1968 decision in Terry through Hiibel in 2004, the Court
has consistently assessed both scope and duration when analyzing the
102
reasonably related prong of the Terry standard.
In United States v.
amounting to probable cause, is necessarily impermissible under the Fourth
Amendment.”).
96. See Terry v. Ohio, 393 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
97. See People v. Pettis, 298 N.E.2d 372, 376 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973) (“[I]t is our
belief that the same reasoning should be applied to photographs as to fingerprints;
i.e., a detention for the sole purpose of initiating or enlarging the defendant’s
records held by the police will be subject to the prohibitions [of the Fourth
Amendment].”); 6 WAYNE LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 11.4(g) (4th ed. 2004)
(suggesting that photos may still be used unless “the photograph was come by as a
consequence of an arrest made for the purpose of adding the defendant’s picture to
the police mug books”). But see People v. Shaver, 396 N.E.2d 643, 648 (Ill. App. Ct.
1979) (justifying the admissibility of a photograph that was obtained during an illegal
detention for the sole purpose of capturing the defendant’s photo under the
“inevitable discovery” doctrine).
98. See Terry, 393 U.S. at 21 (explaining that the police officer must establish
detailed facts that when considered with “rational inferences” reasonably justify the
stop).
99. See infra notes 119–22 and accompanying text (reviewing the scope aspect of
the Terry standard).
100. See infra notes 108–11 and accompanying text (articulating the duration limit
for a Terry-stop).
101. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (explaining “an investigative
detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the
purpose of the stop” and “the investigative methods employed should be the least
intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion in a
short period of time”).
102. See LAFAVE, supra note 82, § 9.3 (describing the Court’s application of the
second prong of the Terry standard in a series of cases). But see Amy L. Vazquez,
Comment, “Do You Have Any Drugs, Weapons, or Dead Bodies in Your Car?” What
Questions Can a Police Officer Ask During a Traffic Stop?, 76 TUL. L. REV. 211, 222 (2001)
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Sharpe, United States v. Hensely, and Florida v. Royer, the Supreme
Court examined both the length of the stops and intrusiveness of the
106
As one commentator explains,
investigations when applying Terry.
“[b]y separating scope and duration, the Court here clearly suggested
that scope is something more than length of the detention. A
reasonable inference can be made that the ‘something more’ should
107
be, and is, the type of questioning and investigating.”
1. Analyzing duration
If a photostop lasts any longer than is necessary to confirm or
dispel the suspicion that justified the stop, then it violates the Fourth
108
Amendment. The Supreme Court has refused to set a specific time
109
limit for a Terry-stop; however, the police violate Terry if they do not
diligently pursue dispelling or confirming their initial suspicion
110
during a photostop.
Even if the police are working to confirm or dispel their initial
suspicion, the extended duration of a stop can make it unreasonable.
111
The Supreme Court ruled in United States v. Place that a ninetyminute delay was too significant of an invasion on an individual’s
Fourth Amendment interests to be justified by reasonable
112
suspicion.
However, the Court held in Sharpe that a detention of

(describing a Federal Circuit split regarding whether officers may ask questions
unrelated to the underlying justification for a traffic stop).
103. 470 U.S. 675 (1985).
104. 469 U.S. 221 (1985).
105. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
106. See Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 676 (noting that in addition to duration, “courts must
also consider the purposes to be served by the stop” when applying the second part
of the Terry inquiry); Hensley, 469 U.S. at 235 (finding that both “the length and
intrusiveness of the stop and detention” were reasonable when police officers
stopped and questioned an individual because one of the officers recognized the
individual from a “wanted flyer”); Royer, 460 U.S. at 500 (finding that “the
investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably
available to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion”).
107. Vazquez, supra note 102, at 226.
108. See Royer, 460 U.S. at 500 (“[A]n investigative detention must be temporary
and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.”).
109. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709–10 (1983) (rejecting adoption of
an “outside time limitation for a permissible Terry stop,” but finding a ninety-minute
delay for the arrival of a drug dog to be impermissible).
110. See id. at 709–10 (noting the importance of brevity to determine if a seizure
can be justified on reasonable suspicion and considering whether “the police
diligently pursue their investigation”). But see, e.g., State v. De La Rosa, 657 N.W.2d
683, 687 (S.D. 2003) (suggesting that the temporal limits of Terry can be expanded
when “the State’s interest in drug interdiction is compelling”).
111. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
112. See id. at 709–10 (emphasizing that police had enough information so as to
have had a drug sniffing dog available immediately).
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twenty minutes was reasonable for an investigatory stop when the
113
officers involved were working diligently.
During an Unrelated Investigatory Stop photostop, the police must
diligently pursue confirming or dispelling their initial suspicion.
Even under Caballes, it would be impermissible to delay a person so
that a photographer or camera could arrive, when the photograph is
114
unrelated to the suspicion that justified the stop.
The Court has defined the durational boundaries of a delay during
a Related Investigatory Stop photostop—a delay of twenty minutes
115
will be permissible and ninety minutes will be impermissible.
However, it is less clear how the Court will deal with photostops of an
intermediate duration.
Unlike Unrelated Investigatory Stop
photostops, Related Investigatory Stop photostops could be
permissible even if the investigation was delayed by the officer’s
request for a photographer or a camera, because the photograph is
116
related to confirming or dispelling the initial suspicion. The police
must act diligently, as the Court emphasized in Place, commenting
that the police could have had a drug investigation unit ready and
117
This suggests that the Court would expect
avoided the delay.
officers to have cameras readily available when on patrol, as they are
118
much less costly and easier to carry than drug detection dogs.

113. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 687–88 (1985) (noting that any
delay was necessary to the investigation).
114. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005) (stating that a seizure for the
sole purpose of issuing a driving citation “can become unlawful if it is prolonged
beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission”).
115. See supra notes 111–14 and accompanying text (establishing the Supreme
Court precedent regarding the permissible duration of Terry-stops).
116. See, e.g., United States v. Lebrun, 261 F.3d 731, 734 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding a
twenty-minute delay for the arrival of a drug dog was reasonable when the officer
suspected the defendant was transporting drugs); United States v. Gil, 204 F.3d 1347,
1351 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding a seventy-five minute detention was reasonable
because the suspect “was detained for only as long as it was necessary [for police] to
complete their investigation”).
117. See Place, 462 U.S. at 710 (concluding police “went beyond the narrow
authority [they] possessed . . . to detain briefly luggage reasonably suspected to
contain narcotics”).
118. See, e.g., United States v. Tavolacci, 895 F.2d 1423, 1427 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(finding a ten to fifteen minute delay was reasonable to wait for a drug dog,
“[a]lthough the dog would have been waiting on the platform in a world where the
time of dogs and their handlers was cost-free”); ConsumerReports.org, Digital
Cameras: More Fun and Features for Less, Nov. 2007, http://www.consumer
reports.org/cro/electronics-computers/cameras-photography/camerascamcorders/digital-cameras/digital-cameras-11-07/overview/digital-cameras-ov.htm
(maintaining that digital camera prices have fallen and “you can now find
respectable compact[] [cameras] with familiar brand names for less than $200”).
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2.

Assessing scope
The scope aspect of the second prong of Terry allows investigative
techniques only to the extent that they can confirm or dispel the
119
Fourth
officer’s suspicion that first justified the encounter.
Amendment scholar Wayne R. LaFave explains, “[t]here are many
other investigative techniques [in addition to interrogation] which
are equally useful but which ordinarily cannot be utilized on a street
corner, such as fingerprinting, photographing, obtaining
handwriting exemplars, obtaining voice exemplars, and conducting a
120
lineup.” The Supreme Court’s dicta in Hayes v. Florida is instructive
and suggests that fingerprinting a suspect during a Terry-stop is
permissible only to the extent that “there is a reasonable basis for
believing that fingerprinting will establish or negate the suspect’s
connection with that crime, and if the procedure is carried out with
121
dispatch.”
Applying this standard, photographs obtained during an Unrelated
Investigatory Stop are unlawful because taking the photograph to
investigate future crime is not reasonably related to the suspicion that
validated the stop initially. A Related Investigatory Stop photostop—
taking and using a photograph to investigate the circumstance that
justified the initial stop—would be permissible and could be
understood as a logical extension of a line of cases that allow the
122
police to show the suspect to victims and witnesses of crimes.
Several state court cases impliedly support the proposition that
police photography during a Terry-stop is a legitimate means to
119. See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (“The scope of the
detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification.”). If additional
suspicion is aroused during the investigation of the initial suspicion, the scope and
duration of the stop can be expanded to investigate the new suspicion. See, e.g.,
United States v. Soto-Cervantes, 138 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding that a
one-hour stop was permissible when the initial investigation of drug activity raised
suspicion about the suspect’s alien registration card and the officer had to wait for an
INS officer to arrive); United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1501 (10th Cir. 1996)
(holding that the stop was permissibly extended for thirty minutes to investigate
suspect’s authority to drive when the suspect did not produce a license). If lawfully
obtained facts provide reasonable suspicion of another offense then the police can
reasonably pursue investigating that offense as well. See, e.g., Medrano v. State, 914
P.2d 804, 808 (Wyo. 1996) (validating officer’s inquiry into drug possession once
reasonable suspicion developed, even though the initial suspicion for the stop was
robbery).
120. LAFAVE, supra note 97, § 9.8 (emphasis added).
121. Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 817 (1985).
122. See, e.g., United States v. Dickson, 58 F.3d 1258, 1263–64 (8th Cir. 1995)
(approving a Terry-stop of three men for fifteen minutes while witnesses from a bank
robbery arrived to possibly identify the robber); State v. Mitchell, 527 A.2d 1168,
1173 (Conn. 1987) (“We note that detaining a suspect to effectuate a viewing by
witnesses to a crime has been deemed to be a permissible investigative technique.”).
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123

investigate suspicious behavior. For example, the Court of Special
124
Appeals of Maryland ruled in Flores v. State that “a brief detention to
determine and immortalize an individual’s identity by photographing
him, to ensure that the correct individual would later be arrested, was
125
not unreasonable.” However, not all photostops can be legitimized
under this reasoning. Unrelated Investigatory Stop photostops are
impermissible because they are not used to later confirm the identity
of an individual whose behavior was being investigated already, but
rather are used to investigate crimes wholly unrelated to those that
126
justified the initial intrusion.
Courts permit physical and photographic line-ups during a Terry127
stop; however, this provides no support for taking and using
photographs during an Unrelated Investigatory Stop. Line-ups or
show-ups, both physical and photographic, are used to investigate the
crime that justified the stop initially and are used to investigate
128
present and past, but not future criminal behavior.
In contrast,
Unrelated Investigatory Stop photostops cannot be justified under
the same rationale because they rely on databases to save the images
129
for the future.
The Supreme Court’s 2004 ruling in Hiibel affirmed police officers’
ability to investigate to the extent justified by present suspicious

123. See, e.g., People v. Green, 700 N.E.2d 1097, 1101–02 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998)
(finding that “the use of photography to memorialize what has been seen by the
naked eye” during a Terry-stop was permissible where the original stop was justified
and the purpose for relying on the photograph was to not immediately give up an
undercover agent’s identity); State v. Wise, 635 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Or. Ct. App. 1981)
(stating in dicta that officers could take pictures during a Terry-stop without
infringing on the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights and then ruling that it was
not an unlawful seizure when the defendant had to wait for the police photographer
to arrive because he consented to having his photograph taken).
124. 706 A.2d 628 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998).
125. Id. at 636–37. The police had probable cause to believe that the appellant
had committed a crime—he had just sold crack cocaine to an undercover police
officer; however, the police did not arrest him immediately after the commission of
the crime because of an ongoing operation. Id. at 630, 636–37. The undercover
officer then radioed the “stop team” and they stopped and obtained a photograph of
the appellant. Id. at 630.
126. See supra notes 99–102 and accompanying text (maintaining that under the
scope component of the Terry standard, it is impermissible to use a photograph for a
purpose other than the one for which the suspect was originally being investigated).
127. See, e.g., Finney v. State, 420 So. 2d 639, 643 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)
(permitting taking suspect’s photograph and detaining the suspect while the
photograph was taken to the hospital so that the victim could identify the
perpetrator in a photographic line-up).
128. See id. (taking and using a suspect’s photograph to investigate a past crime).
129. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (explaining that in Texas suspected
gang members have their photos databased along with their street address for future
use by police).
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130

activity. The Court applied the standard from Terry and ultimately
found that, in the context of a stop based on suspicion of domestic
violence, requesting identification was “reasonably related in scope to
131
the circumstances that justified the initial stop.” The Court limited
its holding to the confines of Terry, explaining that “an officer may
not arrest a suspect for failure to identify himself if the request for
identification is not reasonably related to the circumstances justifying
132
the stop.”
Under Hiibel, the legitimacy of the investigatory technique hinges
upon the possibility of confirming or dispelling the officer’s original
suspicion that justified the stop. This would mean that Related
Investigatory Stop photostops are permissible, but Unrelated
133
Investigatory Stop photostops are illegal.
C.

Forgetting the Scope Requirement: Caballes

Although the standard applied from Terry through Hiibel seemed
well-established, the Supreme Court did not apply this precedent in
134
Caballes. However, it is unclear whether the Supreme Court would
find Caballes to be controlling if faced with the issue of the legitimacy
of photostops.
In Caballes, the Supreme Court held that an investigative technique
does not violate the scope limitation unless the technique “itself
infringed [the suspect’s] constitutionally protected interest in
135
privacy.” This language in Caballes suggests that the Court will first
ask if the investigatory technique is a search, and if it is not, then it
will be per se legitimate. Since photographing that which is exposed
136
to the public is not a search, the photostops would escape Fourth
130. See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text (describing the Court’s holding
in Hiibell v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177 (2004)).
131. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 188 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
132. Id.
133. See id. at 186 (finding that discerning Mr. Hiibel’s identity was a permissible
investigative technique to confirm or dispel suspicion of domestic violence); see also
Carey v. Nev. Gaming Control Bd., 279 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that
asking the suspect for his identification made the detention illegal because the
suspect’s name was irrelevant to determining if he had violated gaming laws); infra
App. 1 (summarizing treatment of photostops under Hiibel).
134. See LAFAVE, supra note 83, § 9.3 (“Had the Supreme Court in Caballes been
true to these precedents, the Court would have held that use of the drug dog, albeit
no search, was unreasonable because it was beyond the scope limitation.”).
135. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005).
136. See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text (explaining that capturing
one’s image is not considered a search because there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy in that which one knowingly exposed to the public). But see Tracey Maclin, Is
Obtaining an Arrestee’s DNA a Valid Special Needs Search Under the Fourth Amendment?
What Should (and Will) the Supreme Court Do?, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 102, 106 (2005)
(arguing that DNA is technically constantly exposed to the public—“losing hair,
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Amendment scrutiny and both Unrelated Investigatory stop and
Related Investigatory Stop photostops would be permissible.
Commentators have been very critical of the Supreme Court’s
137
departure from its well-established precedent.
The Supreme
Court’s decision in Caballes implies that if an investigatory technique
is a non-search, it cannot exceed the permissible scope of a Terry-stop.
Caballes contradicts Supreme Court precedent in prior cases where
the Court has repeatedly entertained challenges to Terry-stops when
138
the police behavior was not a search.
The Caballes decision has received criticism for its veiled departure
139
from precedent and its descent toward suspicionless investigations.
Criticizing the Court’s abrupt and unexplained departure from its
own precedent, one commentator stated:
It is odd, to say the least, that the Supreme Court, in overturning
the state court ruling, never even cited Terry or any of the post-Terry
stop-and-frisk cases discussing those limitations, and, for that
matter, never cited any prior Supreme Court decision at all to justify its
140
holding!

Justice Ginsburg warned in her dissenting opinion that the Caballes
opinion “clears the way for suspicionless, dog-accompanied drug

leaving saliva on a drinking glass at a restaurant, or shedding skin cells”—and its
analysis should still be considered a search).
137. See LAFAVE, supra note 83, § 9.3 (“Just why the Supreme Court would engage
in such adumbrated and oversimplified analysis is hard to comprehend, although
admittedly it is easier to overrule a state court decision if the grounding of that
decision in the Supreme Court’s own precedents is kept totally out of sight.”).
138. See, e.g., Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 186 (considering how related the request for the
suspect’s name was to the purpose of the stop, even though asking someone’s name
is not a search); Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331 (2001) (analyzing first that
the seizure was “limited in time and scope” before determining that the brief
seizure—not letting the defendant go in his home unsupervised, pending issuance of
a warrant—was permissible); Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 817 (1985) (suggesting
that fingerprinting may be allowable incident to a Terry-stop, but only if there is “a
reasonable basis for believing that fingerprinting will establish or negate the suspect’s
connection with that crime”). Hayes applied the “reasonably related” standard even
though prior Court precedent characterized investigative techniques that capture
“physical characteristics . . . constantly exposed to the public” as non-searches. See,
e.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973).
139. See, e.g., Aya Gruber, Garbage Pails and Puppy Dog Tails: Is That What Katz is
Made Of?, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 781, 825 (2008) (“The Caballes Court puts a
normative stamp of approval on a world in which police dogs sniff us at will,
computers constantly inspect our communications, facial recognition machines scan
our features, and contraband detection machines are directed at our homes, cars,
and bodies.”); Nina Paul & Will Trachman, Fidos and Fi-don’ts: Why the Supreme Court
Should Have Found a Search in Illinois v. Caballes, 9 BOALT J. CRIM. L. 1, 17 (2005) (“In
Caballes, . . . the Court improperly ignored the second aspect of the Terry inquiry”).
140. LAFAVE, supra note 83, § 9.3.
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sweeps of parked cars along sidewalks and in parking lots.”
Applying Caballes changes the outcome of the analysis of the
constitutionality of Unrelated Investigatory Stop photostops, making
142
them permissible. However, it is unclear how broadly the Court will
apply its holding from Caballes in a photostop case.
D. Distinguishing Caballes
Caballes can be distinguished from photostops on two grounds.
First, a dog sniff reveals on-going activity at the time of the stop, while
143
a photograph in a database can be accessed in the future. Second,
the stop in Caballes was based on probable cause, not reasonable
144
suspicion.
1. Photographs in databases have a longer life-span
Caballes can be distinguished because it involved dog sniffs, an
investigatory technique the Court has treated as unique due to the
145
Dog sniffs were classified as nonlimited nature of the intrusion.
searches because they reveal only contraband and individuals do not
146
have a recognized privacy interest in illegal items.
The Supreme
Court treated dog sniffs as unique because of their ability to provide
147
limited information that correctly identifies criminality.
However,
141. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 422 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(characterizing the majority opinion as undermining Fourth Amendment protection
by allowing police to search for contraband without suspicion of criminality).
142. See infra App. 1 (summarizing the treatment of photostops under Caballes).
143. See supra notes 75–79 and accompanying text (discussing that the rationale
supporting Terry-stops is to allow officers to investigate imminent or “on-going”
criminal activity).
144. See infra notes 154–56 and accompanying text (explaining the different
standards for each type of stop).
145. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (considering dog sniffs,
the Court maintained “[w]e are aware of no other investigative procedure that is so
limited both in the manner in which the information is obtained and in the content
of the information revealed by the procedure”).
146. See id. (finding that a dog sniff “by a well-trained narcotics detection dog” is a
limited intrusion and “does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would
remain hidden from public view”). This seems to suggest that only the innocent
have privacy rights. But see, e.g., Caballes, 543 U.S. at 422 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(“The Court has never removed police action from Fourth Amendment control on
the ground that the action is well calculated to apprehend the guilty.”); United States
v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717 (1984) (finding that the warrant requirement applies even
if the investigatory technique “is likely to produce evidence of criminal activity”).
147. See Place, 462 U.S. at 707 (describing dog sniffs as sui generis). But see Caballes,
543 U.S. at 410, 411 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting the high false positive error rates
for dog sniffs, contending that “[t]he infallible dog, however, is a creature of legal
fiction” and calling for reconsideration of the holding in Place). In Caballes, the
government argued that the drug dog inspection was not a search and characterized
it as a non-event. See Brief of Petitioner at 9, Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005)
(No. 03-923) (suggesting that it was no different than if the officer “when requesting
respondent’s license and registration, had seen a bag of cocaine or a handgun on the
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even if the dog sniff from Caballes is analogized to the capture of a
suspect’s image during a photostop, there is still a temporal
difference between these investigatory techniques.
Caballes can also be distinguished because it validates investigation
of current criminal behavior—the type of investigation contemplated
in the traditional Terry analysis. This is dramatically different from
the capture and databasing of photographs that are produced during
photostops. A photograph in a database can have an infinite life,
148
whereas a dog sniff investigates only the immediate circumstances.
While Terry initially justified investigation of on-going crime or crime
149
that was “afoot,” the Supreme Court later applied it to past criminal
150
activity.
Terry has been used to validate investigation of crimes happening in
the future, but only when the crime is about to occur. In United States
151
v. Feliciano, the Seventh Circuit discussed how far in the future
152
possible criminal activity could occur to justify a Terry-stop.
The
court maintained:
[I]t can be argued that an articulable suspicion of a crime to be
committed in the distant future would not justify a stop. The long
incubation period of the crime would both attenuate the
probability that the crime would actually be committed and give
the police ample time by further investigation to obtain a better
153
“fix” on that probability.

Following this reasoning, the use of photostops to solve future crime
is temporally too far removed from the initial stop and the police
could use investigative techniques other than databasing
photographs.

passenger seat”). But dog sniffs are not truly “non-events.” See LAFAVE, supra note 82,
§ 9.3 (“use of the dog produces many unpleasant and adverse consequences even for
the innocent driver”). This “non-event” fallacy is comparable to the fallacy that
individuals consent to have their photograph taken because they expose themselves
to the public.
148. See infra Part III.B (exploring the effect that future database searches could
have on the reasonability of the original intrusion).
149. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
150. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985) (“[I]f police have a
reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person they
encounter was involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony, then a
Terry stop may be made to investigate that suspicion.”).
151. 45 F.3d 1070 (7th Cir. 1995).
152. See id. at 1074 (finding that officers could stop two individuals who were
suspected of attempting to lure a victim to mug him or her because they could
potentially assault someone else later that evening).
153. Id.
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2. Photostops based on reasonable suspicion
Further distinguishing photostops, the traffic stop in Caballes was
based on probable cause, whereas a photostop may be based on only
154
The Court has held that Terry is
reasonable articulable suspicion.
relevant for both stops based on reasonable suspicion and traffic
stops based on probable cause, opining that “the usual traffic stop is
155
more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry-stop’ than to a formal arrest.”
The government in Caballes argued that a traffic stop based on
probable cause is conceptually different than a Terry-stop based on
156
However, the Court’s opinion in Caballes
reasonable suspicion.
does not suggest the decision is unique to stops based on probable
cause and there is established precedent that holds Terry-stops and
157
Yet, the Court could use this
traffic stops to the same standards.
difference to distinguish Caballes, should they wish to limit the impact
Caballes has on weakening the reasonably related prong of the Terry
inquiry.
The implications of extending Caballes beyond its facts are
troublesome not only in reference to cases involving photostops, but
also for broader issues in criminal procedure. With the advent of
non-invasive DNA sampling techniques that could be classified as
non-searches, Caballes allows for the possibility that DNA analysis
158
could legitimately be conducted during any Terry-stop.
Should Caballes apply to photostops it will change the
constitutionality of Unrelated Investigatory Stop photostops—those
where the photograph is not reasonably related to the underlying
159
These photostops will be permissible,
justification for the stop.
whereas under the Court’s pre-Caballes precedent they would have
contravened the Fourth Amendment. While there is ample ground
to distinguish Caballes from photostops, Caballes affects only the
permissibility of Unrelated Investigatory Stop photostops. The likely
154. See United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 952–54 (7th Cir. 2002) (explaining
that the Fourth Amendment allows for a larger range of investigative tactics when a
traffic stop is based on probable cause).
155. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984) (internal citation omitted).
156. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 147, at 13–17 (arguing the Court never
intended to limit traffic stops based on probable cause to the confines of Terry).
157. See LAFAVE, supra note 82, § 9.3 (“[W]hile the Court notes in passing that in
[Caballes] the seizure ‘was based on probable cause,’ it is never even hinted that the
point is that the Terry limits have no application when probable cause is
present. . . .”).
158. See Maclin, supra note 136, at 106 (explaining the public exposure doctrine
and maintaining “[i]f one construes this rationale broadly, DNA could be considered
a physical characteristic that is constantly exposed to the public”).
159. See supra notes 134–43 and accompanying text (analyzing the constitutionality
of photostops under Caballes).
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judicial treatment of the other types of photostops is much clearer:
Illegal Stop photostops are impermissible and Related Investigatory
160
Stop photostops are acceptable.
In comparing Caballes and dog sniffs to photostops, the infinite life161
span of photographs in a database is particularly problematic. The
following section considers how the use of photograph databases
changes the nature of the privacy intrusion and individual
experiences.
III. DATABASING AND DERIVATIVE USES OF EVIDENCE
Having explored whether it is permissible to conduct a photostop,
a second question arises: if the photograph were permissibly taken
(i.e., Related Investigatory Stop), can it be entered into a database
even if the initial suspicion has been dispelled? This section
examines the derivative use of evidence and the permissibility of
databasing photographs legally captured, drawing comparisons to the
expansion of DNA databases to include arrestees. While the Court
has only hinted that the subsequent use of evidence could affect the
Fourth Amendment balancing analysis, the Court should expand
their consideration of derivative uses of evidence to account for the
true privacy intrusion an individual experiences when his
information is placed in a database.
A. Expanding Who is Included
With the advent of new investigatory techniques, from
fingerprinting to DNA analysis, there have been calls to expand the
number of individuals whose information is included in each
162
database. Photostops raise the issue of expanding who is included
in photographic databases. Databasing suspects’ or detainees’
photographs would increase the breadth of permissible investigatory
techniques and allow law enforcement officers to apply the standard
accepted for arrestees to non-arrested individuals, who have a
163
superior right to privacy.
160. See supra Parts II.A, II.B (analyzing the treatment of Illegal Stop and Related
Investigatory Stop photostops).
161. See supra Part II.D.1 (establishing that the privacy incursion during a dog sniff
is temporarily limited, whereas a photographic database can be accessed repeatedly).
162. See Simon A. Cole, Fingerprint Identification and the Criminal Justice System:
Historical Lessons for the DNA Debate, in DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 63, 80–
83 (David Lazer ed., 2004) (comparing the debate surrounding expansion of the
fingerprint database to contemporary discussions about the scope of DNA
databases).
163. See Amitai Etzioni, DNA Tests and Databases in Criminal Justice: Individual Rights
and the Common Good, in DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 197, 208–09 (David
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This dilemma is being played out with DNA databases. Most DNA
databases include samples only from individuals convicted of
predicate offenses and this has been upheld as reasonable under the
164
However, some states have moved to
Fourth Amendment.
165
collecting DNA from certain arrestees. Scholars and courts are split
166
on the constitutionality of this practice.
Under the DNA Identification Act of 1994, the Combined DNA
Identification System (CODIS), a federal database, cannot index an
167
Federal
individual’s DNA until he has been convicted of a crime.
authorities cannot legally use CODIS to run searches comparing a
suspect’s DNA to DNA from open cases and is only legally allowed to
168
do these broad searches once the person has been convicted.
While some scholars worry about innocent individuals being
subjected to DNA testing for an arrest-based database, others contend
that the procedural safeguard of having probable cause to arrest an
Lazer ed., 2004) (explaining that a suspect—“a person who has undergone some
kind of legal process that makes it clear that he or she is suspected of having
committed a crime—“has diminished privacy rights, compared to innocent people);
cf. Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1560 (9th Cir. 1995) (articulating that a warrant is
not necessary to take a DNA sample from a prisoner because of his or her diminished
privacy rights).
164. See Aaron P. Stevens, Note, Arresting Crime: Expanding the Scope of DNA
Databases in America, 79 TEX. L. REV. 921, 940–41 (2001) (explaining that these
databases have been upheld judicially by using three approaches: (1) standard
Fourth Amendment analysis; (2) the “special needs” doctrine; and (3) the reduced
expectation of privacy for prisoners); see also United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813,
839 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (holding that suspicionless DNA search of a convicted
parolee was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment).
165. See Eric May, Who’s Next? The Continued Expansion of DNA Databases in United
States v. Kincade, 43 CRIM. L. BULL. 76, 79 n.20 (2007) (noting that Louisiana, Texas
and Virginia require DNA samples from all adult felony arrestees); see also Steve Lash,
Maryland Senate OKs Bill on DNA Collection, DAILY REC. (Balt., Md.), Mar. 26, 2008
(noting that the Maryland Senate passed legislation requiring that a person charged
with a violent crime or breaking into an automobile submit a sample to the DNA
database).
166. Compare In re Welfare of C.T.L., 722 N.W.2d 484, 491 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006)
(finding a Minnesota statute permitting blanket DNA sampling from all charged
defendants unconstitutional on Fourth Amendment grounds), and May, supra note
165, at 104 (contending that unless the DNA is used solely to establish the identity of
the arrestee at the time of the arrest, “[t]here are simply too few valid interests to
warrant the search”), with Kaye, supra note 63, at 472 (opining that arrestee
collection would only be unconstitutional if it were unreasonable, a warrant were
required and officers failed to obtain one, there were no comparison sample from
the crime for which the arrest was made, or the collection of the sample invaded
privacy in another way).
167. See 42 U.S.C. § 14132(a)(4) (2000) (authorizing creation of an index of DNA
from individuals convicted of crimes, crime scene evidence, unidentified human
remains, and “samples voluntarily contributed from relatives of missing persons”).
168. See Etzioni, supra note 163, at 209 (explaining that while the federal
government cannot run these searches, states can do this type of comparison
between suspect and unsolved case samples if they draw upon data from their own
databases).
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169

The Minnesota Supreme Court in In re
individual is sufficient.
170
Welfare of C.T.L. invalidated a statute authorizing DNA sampling
171
from people who have been arrested and charged with a crime.
The court invalidated the statute because a provision of the statute
provided for the destruction of samples from individuals that were
acquitted, which suggests that the “state’s interest in collecting and
storing DNA samples is outweighed by the privacy interest of a person
172
who has not been convicted.”
The Court invalidated the statute
because it treated someone charged and awaiting trial differently
than someone who had been charged and acquitted, even though
173
their privacy interests were the same.
Allowing detainees to be photographed applies the standards
174
acceptable for arrestees to individuals with greater privacy interests.
The reasoning used in In re Welfare of C.T.L. suggests that the
procedures to expunge photographs from databases demonstrates an
intent to protect the privacy interests of innocent individuals and
highlights the problem that photostops treat detainees as though
they had the diminished privacy rights of arrestees. However, this
analysis requires the Court to first define the investigatory technique
175
as a search and it is unlikely to be applied to photostops.

169. See Paul E. Tracy & Vincent Morgan, Big Brother and His Science Kit: DNA
Databases for 21st Century Crime Control?, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 635, 672 (2000)
(“The arrest-based systems are the current thresholds, but here, we have no
assurance of guilt, only suspicion.”). But see Etzioni, supra note 163, at 209
(expressing confidence in procedural safeguards, maintaining “public authorities
cannot indiscriminately declare as suspects anyone they wish to test”). A database of
DNA samples from all members of society has been proposed as a possible
alternative. See D.H. Kaye & Michael E. Smith, DNA Identification Databases: Legality,
Legitimacy and the Case for Population-Wide Coverage, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 413, 415
(contending that a population-wide database is the most effective means of
preserving privacy and social justice); see also Cole, supra note 162, at 72–73
(describing the failed movement for universal fingerprinting).
Some civil
libertarians worry that we are close to having a universal photographic database
through drivers’ license photographs. See Adam Liptak, Driver’s License Emerges as
Crime-Fighting Tool, but Privacy Advocates Worry, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2007, at A10
(describing six states’ work to create databases of drivers’ license photos searchable
with facial-recognition technology).
170. 722 N.W.2d 484, 491 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (noting that it is an accepted
practice for arrestees to be photographed and fingerprinted).
175. See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text (explaining that the “public
exposure” doctrine allows police to photograph that which individuals knowingly
expose to the public without it constituting a search).
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B. Effect of Future Database Searches
When considering the reasonability of the privacy intrusion, the
Supreme Court often fails to consider the continued use of evidence
176
and focuses only on how the evidence is initially obtained.
The
Court’s reasoning is fallacious, suggesting that unlimited use of the
177
evidence does not change the intrusion into an individual’s privacy.
However, as technology has improved, many courts have
acknowledged the difference between traditionally using
photographs and fingerprints for identification, and using these same
178
The ability to preserve and store
items in an evidentiary context.
information in databases has blurred the lines between new and old
179
investigative techniques.
The government’s ability to database evidence and use it to
investigate future crimes changes the nature of the government’s
180
invasion of an individual’s privacy. The “public exposure doctrine”
176. See, e.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1972) (finding no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the sound of one’s voice without considering
the later use of the voice exemplar); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969)
(considering only the circumstances under which the fingerprint evidence was
obtained and not the later use of the evidence).
177. See Krent, supra note 56, at 64 (arguing that “reasonableness cannot be
assessed apart from consideration of the government’s use of the items seized”).
178. The “true identity” exception to the warrant requirement highlights this
distinction between establishing a suspect’s identity to investigate this crime versus
investigating future criminal activity. Historically, arrestees’ photographs and
fingerprints were taken to identify them and an arrestee’s identifying information
would be returned to him if he were acquitted. See, e.g., United States v. Laub Baking
Co., 283 F. Supp. 217, 222–25 (N.D. Ohio 1968) (explaining the difference between
using fingerprints in the identification context versus the evidentiary context);
Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 42 So. 228, 229 (La. 1906) (validating an injunction ordering
that photographic negatives and identifying measurements be removed from police
records and returned because the individual had never been convicted).
179. See Erin Murphy, The New Forensics: Criminal Justice, False Certainty, and the
Second Generation of Scientific Evidence, 95 CAL. L. REV. 721, 728 (2007) (classifying firstgeneration techniques as reactive and self-contained in investigative scope and
capable of supplying “only a narrow slice of information,” whereas second-generation
techniques are proactive and have a broad application). The Automated Fingerprint
Identification System, a database of fingerprints, provides an example of how a
database can convert a first-generation technique into a second-generation
technique because it is searchable and used proactively for investigations. See Cole,
supra note 162, at 83 (explaining the transition from an identification rationale to an
investigative justification for databases); see also Kaye, supra note 63, at 508 (“DNA
databases can do much more than discern an individual’s true identity. They can
associate individuals with crimes.”).
180. See Krent, supra note 56, at 60 (arguing that what the government does with
the information affects the privacy intrusion). Krent explains:
Because the original seizure no longer extinguishes all property or privacy
rights of the individual, governmental authorities violate the Fourth
Amendment if they use the property or information unreasonably even when
lawfully obtained. Particularly in light of new technology, privacy is
threatened as much by what law enforcement authorities do with
information as by the original acquisition itself.
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assumes that if individuals allow a small incursion into their privacy
181
Following this reasoning,
they are consenting to all incursions.
because an individual appeared in public, his photograph can
reasonably be placed in a searchable database with an infinite life.
The Court has hinted on occasion that not only the initial
acquisition of evidence, but also the latter use of evidence can affect
182
the reasonableness of the search and seizure.
In Vernonia School
183
District 47J v. Acton, the Court considered both the intrusiveness of
compelling student athletes to produce urine samples and the
184
subsequent privacy intrusion involved in analyzing the sample.
In
185
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, the Supreme Court held that if an
individual voluntarily gives urine samples to hospital personnel but
does not consent to drug testing, his Fourth Amendment rights
would be violated if the hospital turned over the results of his drug
186
tests to police. The majority opinion disaggregated consent to take
the sample, consent to test for drugs, and consent to turn the results
187
over to the police. Vernonia and Ferguson are examples of the Court
considering the subsequent use of information or evidence when
188
determining reasonability under the Fourth Amendment.
Id.; see also May, supra note 165, at 100 (explaining that DNA sampling from arrestees
is used not only for identification purpose, but to investigate “every past and future
crime” which results in a “significant intrusion into arrestees’ expectations of
privacy”). Additionally, DNA evidence can have the effect of implicating the sample
provider’s blood relatives. See Daniel J. Grimm, The Demographics of Genetic
Surveillance: Familial DNA Testing and the Hispanic Community, 107 COLUM. L. REV.
1164, 1172 (2007) (explaining how familial DNA testing extends the scope of
investigation beyond the known individual to all his or her “previously unknown”
biological relatives).
181. See Sherry F. Colb, What is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment
Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 122 (2002) (articulating a
conceptual flaw in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that “treats exposure to a
limited audience as morally equivalent to exposure to the whole world”).
182. See id. at 179 (suggesting that the Court has found in limited circumstance
that “knowing exposure to a third party does not necessarily forfeit one’s privacy as
against the rest of the world”).
183. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
184. See id. at 658 (analyzing how the sample results were used, noting that the test
was used only to detect drug use and that the results were disclosed only to school
officials); see also Colb, supra note 181, at 179–80 (describing the Court’s reasoning in
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995)).
185. 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
186. See id. at 70, 76 (noting that for purposes of the decision the Court assumed
that there was not valid consent of the patients and ultimately remanded the case for
a determination of the consent issue).
187. Id. at 94 & n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (objecting to this departure from
“established law”); see also Colb, supra note 181, at 171 (analyzing the Court’s
treatment of the issue of consent).
188. See Colb, supra note 181, at 187 (“In addressing . . . perinatal cocaine testing,
for example, the Court specifically refused to say that vulnerability to exposure is the
equivalent of privacy forfeiture and left open the possibility that more robust
doctrines . . . of partial exposure are in the offing.”).
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Under Vernonia and Ferguson, searching the photographic database
could be impermissible, even if initially taking the photograph was
justified. Vernonia and Ferguson allow the consideration of the on189
going intrusions that occur when a database is searched. While the
government interest in solving crime is strong, the reasonability of
using databased photographs would decrease, considering on-going
privacy intrusions and the high fallibility of eyewitness
190
The similarity of the urine sample cases and
identification.
photostops could be challenged because, unlike photographs, the
191
collection of urine samples is considered a search. However, the
patients in Ferguson consented to producing the urine samples and
the use of those samples still contravened the Fourth Amendment,
suggesting that the use of a sample could be impermissible even if the
192
initial acquisition was not a search.
While the Supreme Court has not addressed DNA databasing,
lower courts do not consider the effect that subsequent uses of a
193
database have on an individual’s privacy. In United States v. Kincade,
the Ninth Circuit did not consider each use of the DNA database to
194
be an additional intrusion into the individual’s privacy.
The
analysis neglected to consider that every time the CODIS database is
195
used, Mr. Kincade is considered a suspect.
Applying the standard used in Kincade, the Court would not
consider the privacy intrusion that occurs every time a photographic

189. See supra notes 184–87 and accompanying text (describing the Court’s
consideration of the initial intrusion of procuring the evidence and the additional
intrusion of analyzing the evidence in Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646
(1995) and Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001)).
190. See Henry F. Fradella, Why Judges Should Admit Expert Testimony on the
Unreliability of Eyewitness Testimony, 2 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 2–4 (2007) (reciting the gross
shortcomings of eyewitness identification); Innocence Project, Eyewitness
Misidentification, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/EyewitnessMisidentification.php (last visited Jan. 11, 2008) (explaining that in more than
seventy–five percent of convictions overturned with DNA evidence, eyewitness
misidentification was a cause of the wrongful conviction); supra note 55 and
accompanying text (explaining the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard that
balances the government’s interests and individuals’ rights).
191. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 618 (1989) (finding
the collection of urine samples to be a search under the Fourth Amendment).
192. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 95 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Until today, we have never
held—or even suggested—that material which a person voluntarily entrusts to
someone else cannot be given by that person to the police, and used for whatever
evidence it may contain.”).
193. 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
194. See id. at 836–39 (considering only drawing the sample when addressing the
constitutionality of parolee DNA searches).
195. See May, supra note 165, at 90, 92 (explaining that even when Mr. Kincade’s
supervised release is over and his expectation of privacy fully restored, his profile will
still be in the CODIS database).
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database is searched. In reality, every time a mug book is paged
through or a gang database is searched, the individuals whose
196
photographs are included are considered suspects. The dissenting
opinion in Kincade objects to the continued retention of Mr.
Kincade’s DNA sample once he completes his period of supervised
197
The
release and “recovers his full Fourth Amendment rights.”
dissent’s consideration of the retention of the sample suggests that
198
subsequent uses can affect the reasonableness of the initial search.
However, there are still only hints that the Court would be willing to
consider the subsequent uses of databased evidence in addressing the
199
reasonableness of the privacy intrusion.
Simply because the government legally obtains evidence does not
200
guarantee unlimited derivative uses of that evidence. Facing public
criticism and the threat of litigation, at least one community where
law enforcement officials were capturing photographs during
investigatory stops has chosen to destroy or return the photographs
201
However, not all
once the original suspicion has been dispelled.
202
police departments are so willing to return evidence.
While the Kincade plurality did not consider the subsequent use of
203
the DNA database in their analysis, compelling arguments can be
made for judicial consideration of the use of evidence when
considering the reasonability of its acquisition. So far the Court has
only hinted that the subsequent use of evidence could affect the

196. See supra notes 15–22 and accompanying text (describing how “mug books”
and the GangNet database function).
197. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 872 (9th Cir. 2004) (en
banc)(Kozinski, J., dissenting).
198. See May, supra note 165, at 91 n.122 (noting that the dissenting judges in
Kincade would have found the DNA act more reasonable if it provided for removing
samples after the government’s interests lapse, suggesting that the later use and
treatment of the sample affects the reasonableness of the capture).
199. Cf. Colb, supra note 181, at 184 (noting that “[t]he Court has . . . set out some
of the ingredients for a more robust Fourth Amendment protection”).
200. See supra note 64 (detailing cases where courts have classified the analysis of
legally obtained evidence as a search).
201. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (describing the agreement the
Philadelphia Police Department reached stipulating that once an individual is
cleared of suspicion his photograph will be destroyed).
202. See Michelle Hibbert, DNA Databanks: Law Enforcement’s Greatest Surveillance
Tool?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 767, 810 (1999) (explaining that not all states expunge
the DNA of wrongly convicted and exonerated individuals); Murphy, supra note 179,
at 738 n.72 (describing police “dragnets” where individuals have voluntarily provided
DNA samples, then were forced to file motions for the sample to be returned to
them once the case was closed).
203. See United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 836–39 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc)
(assessing only drawing the initial blood sample in evaluating the search and
rejecting the argument that the subsequent retention of the DNA affects the Fourth
Amendment analysis).
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Fourth Amendment balancing analysis. The Court should expand
their consideration of derivative uses of evidence to account for the
true privacy intrusion an individual experiences when his
information is placed in a database.
CONCLUSION
While Illegal Stop photostops are constitutionally impermissible
and Related Investigatory Stop photostops are permissible, the
constitutionality of Unrelated Investigatory Stop photostops hangs on
the applicability of Caballes. Under the two-pronged test established
in Terry and cited with approval through Hiibel, Unrelated
Investigatory Stop photostops are constitutionally impermissible
because the photographs produced are not a means of investigation
reasonably related to confirming or dispelling the suspicion that
originally justified the investigatory stop. However, the legitimacy of
Unrelated Investigatory Stop photostops now depends on how
broadly the Court chooses to apply the newly established standard
from Caballes. Failing to distinguish Caballes, Unrelated Investigatory
Stop photostops will be considered constitutional under the Fourth
Amendment.
Ultimately, the Court should acknowledge the repeated privacy
intrusions that occur when a database is searched. Databases
produce a troubling “laundering effect,” in that by entering an
individual into a database, the taint of a racial, economic and
geographically biased and imperfect judicial system is removed and
204
their profile in the database is reduced to “objective information.”
The legislature is unlikely to limit the use of photostops and
photographic databases because of the political perception that they
205
affect the privacy rights of only criminals and gang members.
Therefore, it is up to the courts to carefully apply Terry and its
progeny, move towards a broader application of the derivative use
rationales of Ferguson and Vernonia and safeguard individuals’ Fourth
Amendment rights.

204. See Cole, supra note 162, at 83 (explaining this “effect” in the context of DNA
databases).
205. Cf. May, supra note 165, at 104 (maintaining that “[b]ecause legislatures
rarely consider the privacy interests of arrestees and former criminals, the courts
must defend the Fourth Amendment’s protections” when considering DNA
databases); Lash, supra note 165 (reporting, before the Maryland Senate approved
legislation authorizing a DNA database of individuals charged with a violent crimes
or an auto break in, one senator stated “‘I firmly believe in the presumption of
innocence,’ . . . . But he added that ‘crime is just too high’ in Baltimore”).
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APPENDIX 1. SUMMARIZING PHOTOSTOPS
Photograph
related to
original
justification
for stop?

Is capture
legal
under
Terry?

Is capture
legal
under
Caballes?

Circumstance
producing
photograph

Is it an
investigatory
stop?

Reasonable
articulable
suspicion
for stop?

“Long-range
Lenses”

No

No stop
occurs

No stop
occurs

Legal

Legal

“Mug Shot”

Yes

Yes—
probable
cause to
arrest

Does not
matter

Legal

Legal

“Illegal Stop”

Yes

No

No

Illegal

Illegal

“Unrelated
Investigatory
Stop”

Yes

Yes

No

Illegal

Legal

“Related
Investigatory
Stop”

Yes

Yes

Yes

Legal

Legal

